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Abstract—Multi-tenant cloud networks have various security
and monitoring service functions (SFs) that constitute a service
function chain (SFC) between two endpoints. SF rule ordering
overlaps and policy conflicts can cause increased latency, service
disruption and security breaches in cloud networks. Software
Defined Network (SDN) based Network Function Virtualization
(NFV) has emerged as a solution that allows dynamic SFC
composition and traffic steering in a cloud network. We propose
an SDN enabled Universal Policy Checking (SUPC) framework,
to provide 1) Flow Composition and Ordering by translating
various SF rules into the OpenFlow format. This ensures
elimination of redundant rules and policy compliance in SFC. 2)
Flow conflict analysis to identify conflicts in header space and
actions between various SF rules. Our results show a significant
reduction in SF rules on composition. Additionally, our conflict
checking mechanism was able to identify several rule conflicts
that pose security, efficiency, and service availability issues in
the cloud network.
Index Terms—Software Defined Network (SDN), Service Func-
tion Chaining (SFC), Network Function Virtualization (NFV),
Security Policy Conflicts
I. INTRODUCTION
Service Functions (SFs) comprise a class of middleboxes,
such as Firewall, Intrusion Detection System (IDS) and Deep
Packet Inspection (DPI), that examine and modify the traf-
fic and flows in a sophisticated fashion. The SFs at the
network level is known as Network Functions (NFs) [3].
Network Function Virtualization (NFV) proposes replacement
of hardware middleboxes with flexible and programmable
software middleboxes, which is referred to as Virtual Network
Functions (VNFs) [4].
Lack of a common protocol standard among middleboxes
makes it hard to debug the configuration errors. In case of
any middlebox failure, network administrators rely on ad-
hoc rules to resolve the issue, which lacks a comprehensive
view of the overall network and are error prone [1]. Current
Service Function Chaining (SFC) solutions that consider VNF
policy ordering and policy compliance [5], [3] do not analyze
the policies at the granularity of the packet header. The
policy specifications of SF and actual implementation on the
network are often quite different, and without a common
standard to interpret various SFs, the ordering mechanism
is hard to be verified. Network-wide policy enforcement
solution for middleboxes discussed in FlowTags [2] may not
scale well on a large cloud network since tracking of tags
across various VNFs and backtracking in case of SF failure
can be quite difficult. The policy composition mechanisms
such as PGA [8], implement SFs multiple times in order to
achieve the desired security objectives, however, there is a
significant overlap in the packet header and actions of SFs,
which slows down the SF performance. The solutions that
focus exclusively on security enforcement in SFC [9], [11]
do not consider the overlap between the packet header and
the associated actions in SFC, which can cause policy level
conflicts.
SDN has the capability of dynamically managing VNF con-
nections and data plane flows as discussed by Trajkovska et
al. [10]. SDN utilizes OpenFlow [6] (programmable network
protocol) for interacting with forwarding plane of network
devices [6]. In the SUPC framework, we reduce all SF
configuration to OpenFlow rules in order to have a global
view of the network. This SDN controller OpenDaylight in
our framework provides end-to-end visibility to help resolve
misconfiguration related failures. SUPC framework utilizes
an OpenFlow format to identify conflicting scenarios across
different SFs. The presence of common rule format also helps
in automatic verification of security policies across various
SFs. The key contributions of this research work are as
follows:
• SUPC utilizes packet header fields and traffic steering of
SFs and to composes a set of OpenFlow rules with no
duplicates. We incorporate correct service ordering by
assigning priority to flow rules derived from SFs with
higher precedence. We were able to achieve a significant
reduction in the number of rules to be processed and the
flow composition time in our experimental analysis.
• SUPC identifies four major type of rule conflicts based
on important network and security properties. We identi-
fied 100s of conflicts in our SDN cloud dataset with 25k
OpenFlow rules, which can cause security conflicts and
network service failures.
II. RELATED WORK
Security in SFC has been modeled in SICS [11]. The authors
consider rule composition, header space mapping, order and
priority of various requirements specified as part of SFC. The
algorithm is however based on simple predicate logic, which
doesn’t allow deductive reasoning to make some inference
about rule conflicts as in case of our work. Network security
defense pattern (NSDP) based on multiple objectives such as
security, minimal resource wastage, fault tolerance has been
ar
X
iv
:1
81
1.
00
65
7v
1 
 [c
s.C
R]
  1
 N
ov
 20
18
proposed by Sendi et al. [9]. Authors use mechanisms such
as decomposition, composition, location and zone awareness
for service chain composition. Our work uses a constrained
set of OpenFlow rule representation which will be more cost
efficient in terms of SFC latency compared to this solution.
Policy Aware SFC has been discussed by Joseph et al. [5].
Authors separate policy from reachability in SFC in order
to ensure correctness and flexibility. FlowTags [2] extends
SDN architecture for adding tags to outgoing packets. This
provides a necessary context for policy enforcement. These
works do not, however, consider possible overlaps between
network policies based on packet header match. Works that
focus on policy safety and efficiency of SFC like SDN based
virtual firewall discussed by Brew [7] consider issues like
semantic consistency, and scalability but their application is
limited to the firewall SF.
III. BACKGROUND
SDN based SFC: We consider the multi-tenant cloud network
as a use case to highlight some of these issues in detail.
In this example, we consider two Compute nodes with four
SFs namely Classifier (C), IDS, VPN and Load Balancer
(LB). We discuss a few ordering and placement strategies and
highlight the shortcomings below. Our SFC has the following
requirements:
1) Traffic coming into the network should be classified into
different categories based on source IP address using
Classifier SF.
2) Any traffic not part of data network security domain
should be processed via Intrusion Detection System.
3) Data network traffic and SDN controller traffic should
go through Load balancing SF.
4) Control plane traffic from SDN controller should be
encrypted using public key encryption scheme.
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Figure 1. Service Function Chaining Example in Cloud Network
The nodes in an SFC architecture can be SFs or Service Func-
tion Forwarders (SFFs). An SFF is responsible for forwarding
traffic packets or frames received from a particular network
segment to associated SFs using the information encapsulated
in the packet. In the Figure 1 the Open vSwitch (OVS) bridge
acts as SFF.
The Service Function Path (SFP) is the actual path traversed
by the packet/frame from source to destination in SFC after
application of granular policies and operational constraints in
SFC. For instance in the Figure 1, there are three SFPs -
SFP1, SFP2, SFP3 corresponding to Data Net, Public Net
and SDN controller traffic.
Strategy 1 Order: C → V PN → IDS → LB.
Issue: SDN controller traffic needs to go through both VPN
and IDS as per policy, placing VPN first (incorrect order)
violates security objective. Thus, IDS should precede VPN,
since VPN encrypts the traffic and IDS can operate only on
the raw traffic.
Strategy 2 Order: C → LB → IDS → V PN .
Issue: The traffic from SDN controller and data network has to
go through classifier and load balancer. Malicious traffic could
have been filtered out using IDS policy resulting in less impact
on QoS offered by the load balancer. The incorrect placement
leads to an efficiency issue. In order to preserve both security
and efficiency constraints, we design better placement and
ordering as shown in Fig. 1 - Strategy 3.
Strategy 3 Order: C → IDS → V PN → LB.
Efficient Placement is obtained in this strategy since unwanted
traffic is filtered at IDS and load balancer has to deal with
only legitimate traffic from Data-Net and SDN Controller.
Correct Ordering is obtained for SDN controller traffic. The
traffic is passed in raw (un-encrypted) format through IDS,
and later through VPN thus IDS has complete visibility.
Source Destination
Firewall IDS Load Balancer
L2Src L2Dst L3Src L3Dst L4Src L4Dst Protocol Action
OpenFlow Match Action Stats
Flow Table [1..n]
Firewall IDS
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Balancer
Figure 2. Packet Header space Overlap
Creation of SFC can lead to several options. We observed that
current deployments of SFs in current works lack following
desirable properties, which leads to the presence of redundant
and conflicting rules in SFC:
(i) SF Rule Ordering and Composition: Figure 2 shows that
the packet header space of Firewall, IDS, and Load Balancer
in SFC overlap with each other. Inefficient placement of SFs
can incur communication cost on the network. For instance, if
IDS was placed before Firewall, IDS would have to analyze
traffic which may be dropped by Firewall in the current
arrangement. (ii) SF Conflict Analysis: We identified several
conflicting scenarios in security and traffic processing policies
in SFC after the composition of SF rules into OpenFlow
format due to partial or full overlap in packet match and action
fields of SF rules. These conflicts can cause security policy
violations due to conflicting actions and service disruption
because some symmetric traffic flows require configuration
changes for incoming and outgoing traffic.
IV. SFC COMPOSITION AND CONFLICT CHECKING
The possible overlap in packet header provides scope for
policy composition and traffic steering in an efficient fashion.
We automate flow rule match (layer 2-4 headers) and action
set composition to OpenFlow rules at each middlebox in SFC.
A. Flow Composition
To illustrate the flow composition problem we take example
of traffic manipulation and access control policies of some
SFs and their corresponding translation into OpenFlow rules.
In OpenFlow specification [6], each flow rule is a tuple of
three sets, i.e. - match, action (A) and priority (P). We define
each flow rule Ri = {matchi, Ai, Pi}. The match field for
each rule Ri consists of several sub-fields such as source
MAC address l2si, destination MAC address l2di , source
IP address l3si, destination IP address l3di, source port l4si,
destination port l4di, protocol ρi. We consider seven sub
fields for our conflict detection model. Thus, match(Ri) =
{l2si, l2di, l3si, l3di, l4si, l4di, ρi}.
Source Protocol L2Src L2Dst L3Src L3Dst L4Src L4Dst Action Priority
IDS tcp * * 192.168.1.0/24 * * !6000-6010 LOG 1
Firewall tcp * * 192.168.1.0/28 * * * DROP 2
Source Protocol L2Src L2Dst L3Src L3Dst L4Src L4Dst Action Priority
Firewall tcp * * 192.168.1.0/24 * * * DROP 1
IDS tcp * * 192.168.1.0/24 * * !6000-6010 LOG 2
(a) OpenFlow rules before priority inversion
(b) OpenFlow rules after priority inversion
action   protocol          srcip srcport dstip dstport - (1) IDS Rule Format
LOG          tcp 192.168.1.0/24      any      any       !6000-6010            - (2) IDS Rule
target    protocol          opt        in      out         srcip dstip - (3) Firewall Rule Format
DROP tcp -- *       *     192.168.1.0/28        *                    -(4) Firewall Rule
Figure 3. Flow Composition Example
Consider a Snort IDS rule - line 2 and Firewall rule line 4
in Figure 3. Figure 3(a) shows the OpenFlow rules composed
from security policy rules. The IDS rule and the Firewall rule
can be translated to OpenFlow rule using one to one mapping
of header fields, e.g., srcipIDS and dstipIDS are added as
L3 Src and L3 Dst in the flow table of OpenFlow switch.
Similarly, srcport and dstport of IDS rules are added as L4
Src and Dst. The module also checks for the ordering of SFs
based on the source of flow rules. As can be seen from the
Figure, the IDS has header space overlap because the layer 3
source and destination of IDS and Firewall are overlapping,
i.e. {L3Firewall ⊂ L3IDS}. The IDS will have to handle
additional traffic, which is matching the header space of the
firewall rule. Ideally, the firewall rule should be applied before
the IDS, so that traffic corresponding to L3Firewall is dropped
and only the traffic from the set {matchFirewall\matchIDS}
is processed by IDS. The flow composition, in our SFC
implementation, inverts the priority of the rules, Figure 3(b).
In the algorithm 1, we current rule list from various net-
work functions is represented by S. In the lines 7-13, we
perform one-one mapping of the protocol defined in SF rule,
Algorithm 1 Flow Rule Composition
1: procedure FLOW RULE COMPILATION(R, S)
2: R← HashSet
3: S ← service function rules
4: s ∈ S . All Netfilter, proxy, IDS rules in S
5: i ∈ {1, n}
6: PFW ← Priority Set
7: for si ∈ S do
8: Ri.match().prot() ← si.prot()
9: Ri.match().ipSrc() ← si.ipSrc()
10: Ri.match().ipDst() ← si.ipDst()
11: Ri.match().sPort() ← si.sPort()
12: Ri.match().dPort() ← si.dPort()
13: Ri.action() ← si.action()
14: if si ∈ S.Netfilter() then
15: Ri.match().hwSrc() ← si.hwSrc()
16: Ri.match().hwDst() ← si.hwDst()
17: Ri.prior() ← rand(1,65535)
18: PFW .add(Ri.prior())
19: else if si ∈ S.IDS() then
20: Ri.prior() ← rand(max(PFW , 65535))
layer 3 sources and destination address, layer 4 sources, and
destinations addresses. In the 14 we check the source of
SF, i.e., firewall or IDS. If the source is a firewall, we add
layer 2 sources and destination address into flow rule we are
composing - lines 15-16. We assign a random priority - line
17 from 1-65535 (upper limit of OpenFlow rule priority). If
the source is IDS - line 19, we assign a priority value to flow
rule greater than firewall rule set, so when OpenFlow rules
are processed, firewall rules gets precedence over IDS rule as
discussed in example Figure 3.
B. Conflict Checking
Rule 1 Rule 2
{𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ 𝑅1 ∩𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ 𝑅2 } ෡& {𝐴 𝑅1 ≠ 𝐴(𝑅2)}
{𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ 𝑅1 ∩𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ 𝑅2 } ෡& {𝐴 𝑅1 = 𝐴(𝑅2)}
Rule 2
Rule 1
{𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ 𝑅1 ⊆ 𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ 𝑅2 } ෡& {𝐴 𝑅1 ≠ 𝐴(𝑅2)}
{𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ 𝑅1 ⊆ 𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ 𝑅2 } & {𝐴 𝑅1 = 𝐴(𝑅2)}
(a) Intersection
(b) Subsumption
Rule 1 Rule 2 Rule 3= Rule 4
{𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ 𝑅1 , 𝐴 𝑅1 → 𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ 𝑅2 , 𝐴 𝑅2 =
𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ 𝑅3 , 𝐴 𝑅3 }
{𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ 𝑅3 ∩𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ 𝑅4 } ෡& {𝐴 𝑅3 ≠ 𝐴(𝑅4)}
Rule 1 + Rule 4
(c) Transitivity
(d) Symmetry
𝑃 𝑆𝑦𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑦 ←
𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ 𝑅1 , 𝐴 𝑅1 ∪ {𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ 𝑅2 , 𝐴 𝑅2 }
Figure 4. Security Conflict Issues in SFC
We have identified four types of conflicting scenarios that
can lead to security violations,i.e., Intersection, Subsumption,
Transitivity and Symmetry as shown in Figure 4. The algo-
rithm 2 presents the details of conflict analysis in current
OpenFlow rules composed from SFs.
The Figure 5 consists of OpenFlow rules which we will use
to provide examples of each type of conflicting scenario in
Figure 4. We do not consider fields such as packet counters,
timeout duration, etc. in conflict analysis.
Intersection is a class of conflicts where the packet header
has partial overlap across two different rules, and the actions
Algorithm 2 Conflict Checking Algorithm
1: procedure RULE CONFLICT CHECKING(R)
2: R← current flow rules
3: R = {match(R), A(R)}
4: C ← Conflict Set
5: for i ∈ {1,n} do
6: for j ∈ {1,n} do
7: if match(Ri) ∩match(Rj) 6= ∅ then
8: C.add(Intersection)
9: else if match(Ri) ⊆ match(Rj) OR match(Rj) ⊆
match(Ri) then
10: C.add(Subsumption)
11: else if match(Ri) → match(Rj) = match(Rk)
then
12: if match(Rk) ∩match(R) 6= ∅ AND A(Rk) ∩
A(R) 6= ∅ then
13: C.add(Transitivity)
14: else if P (Symm) → {match(Ri), A(Ri)} ∪
{match(Rj), A(Rj)} then
15: if P (Symm) ∩match(R) 6= ∅ then
16: C.add(Symmetry)
Rule-ID Prot L2 Src L2 Dst L3 Src L3 Dst L4 Src L4 Dst Action
1 tcp * * 192.168.1.0/24 192.168.2.20 * * ALLOW
2 tcp * * 192.168.1.16 192.168.2.0/24 * * ALLOW
3 tcp * * 192.168.1.18 192.168.2.0/24 * * DENY
4 tcp * * 192.168.1.0/24 192.168.2.0/28 * * ALLOW
5 tcp * * 192.168.1.0/28 192.168.2.0/28 443 443 DENY
6 tcp * * 192.168.2.0/24 192.168.3.0/24 * * ALLOW
7 tcp * * 192.168.1.0/24 192.168.3.0/24 80 80 DENY
8 tcp * * 192.168.2.0/24 192.168.1.0/24 * * ALLOW
9 tcp * * 192.168.2.12 192.168.1.0/24 * 80 DENY
Figure 5. SFC Rule Conflict Scenarios
are either same or different. For instance the rules 1 and 2 in
Figure 5, l3s2 ⊂ l3s1 and l3d1 ⊂ l3d2, A(R1) == A(R2).
Therefore, {match(R1) ∩ match(R2)} 6= φ. Similarly, for
rules 1 and 3, l3s3 ⊂ l3s1 and l3d1 ⊂ l3d3, A(R1) 6= A(R2).
The match fields for rules 1 and 3 have {match(R1) ∩
match(R3)} 6= φ. So rules 2 and 3 have Intersection conflict
with rule 1.
Subsumption refers to class of conflicts where header match
of one rule is completely subsumed by another rule, and
the actions are similar or dissimilar. For the rules 1 and 4,
match(R4) ⊆ match(R1) and A(R4) == A(R1). Another
scenario of Subsumption is for the rules 1 and 5, i.e.,
match(R5) ⊆ match(R1), whereas A(R5) 6= A(R1). We
classify all such conflicts in the class Subsumption.
Transitivity is a class of conflicts where the flow rule is not
defined explicitly but the combination of two flow rules leads
to an inferred flow rule. If the inferred flow rule can be in a
state of conflict with a predefined flow rule for same header
match. Consider rules 1, 6 and 7. actions for match fields
l3s1 = 192.168.1.0/24 and l3d1 = 192.168.2.0/24 is ALLOW.
The action for rule 6, i.e. A(R6) for match fields l3s6 =
192.168.1.0/24 and l3d6 = 192.168.1.0/24 is ALLOW. We can
infer a new rule from these two rule, i.e., R1 → R6 = Rx.
For the rule Rx, the traffic between source 192.168.1.0/24 and
destination 192.168.3.0/24 should be allowed by transitivity.
Considering inferred rule x and rule 7, the match fields,
match(R7) ⊆ match(Rx), however the action for rule 7,
i.e. A(R7) is in conflict with action for the rule inferred -
A(Rx) 6= A(R7). We classify all such scenarios into a class
of transitive conflicts.
Symmetry is a required property for some applications that
require bi-directional connections to maintain a persistent
session. For example, a stateful firewall SF requires 3-
way handshake ’SYN’ from source to destination, ’SYN-
ACK’ from destination to source and ’ACK’ from source
to destination. If the source address l3s is 192.168.1.12
and destination address l3d is 192.168.2.10, the property -
symmetry is satisfied iff R1 and R8 are working together,
i.e., P (Symmetry) ← R1, R8. However if we check rule
9, the action for rule 9 conflicts with the action of rule 8.
The P (symmetry) implies {match(R1)∪match(R8)} and
A(R1) == A(R8). However, match(R8) ∩match(R9) 6= φ
and A(R8) 6= A(R9). Thus, rule 9 violates the symmetry
property.
V. IMPLEMENTATION AND EVALUATION
A. Flow Composition Analysis
We implemented Bro IDS and Linux Firewall (Netfilter) as
SFs on two separate Ubuntu 16.04 VMs, between source and
destination. The SFC classification policy was configured in
a way that data plane traffic of the communicating machines
was required to pass through the SFs.
The second column in the Table I denotes number of Netfilter
and IDS rules combined that are invoked in SFC source →
Netfilter → IDS → destination. It can be observed that
the header fields of most of the signature-based rules present
in these SFs overlap with each other and result in same
OpenFlow rules. There was about 97% reduction in number
of rules ( 542056 ×100 ≈ 3%) if the SF rules are composed into
OpenFlow rules. As the time increased, from 5s to 25s, the
number of SF rules invoked increase from 2056 to 13472, but
the number of distinct OpenFlow rules only increase from 54
to 201. Thus, Flow composition can lead to a significant gain
in terms of performance on a network with large number of
SFs.
1) Composition Time Comparitive Analysis: We performed
a comparative analysis of composition time for our algo-
rithm 1 against policy composition time of PGA [8] and
SICS framework [11]. We use rules as a generic term to
define PGA nodes, SICS rules, and OpenFlow rules, and to
have a common comparison format. We observed that SUPC
achieves faster composition time - 20s for 10k rules, and
25s for about 12k rules. The composition time for SICS was
Time (s) IDS+Netfilter Rules Flow Rules
5 2056 54
10 4014 85
15 7166 104
20 9686 171
25 12241 179
30 13472 201
Table I
IDS AND NETFILTER OPENFLOW RULE COMPOSITION
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Figure 6. Number of Rules vs Composition Time - SUPC, PGA [8],
SICS [11]
slightly higher than our algorithm, i.e., 31.5s for 10k rules
and 37.5s for 12k rules. The composition time for PGA scales
poorly with the number of rules as can be seen in the Figure 6.
PGA takes about 400s for the composition of 10k rules and
500s for 12k rules. The performance degradation in SICS can
be attributed to encryption overhead, whereas in case of PGA,
the poor scaling is because of duplication of SFs across the
network. The comparison of SUPC with these frameworks
shows that our flow composition algorithm will scale well
with the number of SF rules.
B. Flow Conflict Analysis
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Figure 7. Number of Conflicts in SFC
We performed experiment to analyze the number of conflicts
- Intersection (Int), Submsumption (Sub), Transitivity (Trans)
and Symmetry (Sym) in the translated OpenFlow rules. The
x-axis in the Figure 7 denotes the number of OpenFlow
rules - 5k, 16k, and 25k. As the number of OpenFlow rules
increased, we observed an increase in the number of conflicts.
A remote attacker can gain access to network resources by
taking advantage of these rule conflicts. The Subsumption
conflicts can lead to redundant policy checks, thus leading to
extra processing overhead. The Symmetry conflicts can lead to
disruption of service since flow in both directions is required
for stateful applications to maintain a persistent session.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
The paper presents SUPC, an automated SF composition and
conflict analysis framework. SUPC translates traffic and se-
curity policies of various SF into common OpenFlow format.
This helps in elimination of redundant policy rules, network-
wide policy enforcement using SDN controller, and conflict
identification across heterogeneous SFs each having their own
policy specification language. Our experimental results on the
dataset of Netfilter firewall rules and Bro IDS achieved a
significant reduction in matching rules ∼ 97% due to Flow
Composition, which leads to performance gain in SFC. We
also identified four class of conflicts among the rules of
various SFs which can cause security violations and service
disruption. Our experiments for Flow Conflict analysis on
the dataset of an order of 1000s of rules is able to identify
different possible conflicting cases.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
This research is based upon work supported by the
NRL N00173-15-G017, NSF Grants 1642031, 1528099, and
1723440, and NSFC Grants 61628201 and 61571375.
REFERENCES
[1] L. Durante, L. Seno, F. Valenza, and A. Valenzano. A model for the
analysis of security policies in service function chains. In Network
Softwarization (NetSoft), 2017 IEEE Conference on, pages 1–6. IEEE,
2017.
[2] S. K. Fayazbakhsh, V. Sekar, M. Yu, and J. C. Mogul. Flowtags:
Enforcing network-wide policies in the presence of dynamic middlebox
actions. In Proceedings of the second ACM SIGCOMM workshop on
Hot topics in software defined networking, pages 19–24. ACM, 2013.
[3] A. Gember-Jacobson, R. Viswanathan, C. Prakash, R. Grandl, J. Khalid,
S. Das, and A. Akella. Opennf: Enabling innovation in network func-
tion control. In ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review,
volume 44, pages 163–174. ACM, 2014.
[4] M. Ghaznavi, N. Shahriar, R. Ahmed, and R. Boutaba. Service function
chaining simplified. arXiv preprint arXiv:1601.00751, 2016.
[5] D. A. Joseph, A. Tavakoli, and I. Stoica. A policy-aware switching
layer for data centers. In ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication
Review, volume 38, pages 51–62. ACM, 2008.
[6] N. McKeown, T. Anderson, H. Balakrishnan, G. Parulkar, L. Peterson,
J. Rexford, S. Shenker, and J. Turner. Openflow: enabling innovation in
campus networks. ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review,
38(2):69–74, 2008.
[7] S. Pisharody, J. Natarajan, A. Chowdhary, A. Alshalan, and D. Huang.
Brew: A security policy analysis framework for distributed sdn-based
cloud environments. IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure
Computing, PP(99):1–1, 2017.
[8] C. Prakash, J. Lee, Y. Turner, J.-M. Kang, A. Akella, S. Banerjee,
C. Clark, Y. Ma, P. Sharma, and Y. Zhang. Pga: Using graphs to express
and automatically reconcile network policies. In ACM SIGCOMM
Computer Communication Review, volume 45, pages 29–42. ACM,
2015.
[9] A. S. Sendi, Y. Jarraya, M. Pourzandi, and M. Cheriet. Efficient pro-
visioning of security service function chaining using network security
defense patterns. IEEE Transactions on Services Computing, 2016.
[10] I. Trajkovska, M.-A. Kourtis, C. Sakkas, D. Baudinot, J. Silva, P. Harsh,
G. Xylouris, T. M. Bohnert, and H. Koumaras. Sdn-based service
function chaining mechanism and service prototype implementation in
nfv scenario. Computer Standards & Interfaces, 54:247–265, 2017.
[11] H. Wang, X. Li, Y. Zhao, Y. Yu, H. Yang, and C. Qian. Sics: Secure
in-cloud service function chaining. arXiv preprint arXiv:1606.07079,
2016.
